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Gateway Widens Doorway
0""ito Inposmg Unfair Binding
Arbitration on Consumers
by Jean R. Sternlight
en Rich and Enza Hill
opened the boxes to their
W new Gateway 10th Anni-
W versary computer system,
they had no idea they were trading
their right to ajury trial for binding ar-
bitration. Nonetheless, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
because the boxes contained a 'Stan-
dard Terms and ConditionsAgreement
including an arbitration clause, the
Hills waived their right to sue Gateway
in court when they failed to return the
computer within 30 days.' Instead, the.
Hills could only file a claim against
Gateway in arbitration, and pay fees
totaling at least $2,000 to get there.2
Hill v. Gateway,3 is but the most ex-
treme example of a series of court deci-
sions that allow large companies to
impose potentially unfair binding arbi-
tration agreements on unwitting con-
sumers. When a California bank sent
its customers an envelope stuffer an-
nouncing that all future claims against
the bank must be arbitrated rather
than litigated, thereby precluding such
consumers from having their claims
heard by ajury, a California state court
upheld the clause.4 At least one Florida
bank, First Union, has similarly sent
their customers mailings announcing in
small print that all future disputes with
the bank must be arbitrated rather
than litigated.5 In a less extreme case,
Florida's Fifth District Court ofAppeal
held that consumers who purchased
pest extermination services were re-
quired to arbitrate not only contractial
disputes but also personal injury claims
that allegedly resulted from the exter-
mination, where they signed an arbi-
tration clause as part of the contract,6
In the health care context, the Utah
Supreme Court, in Sosa v. Paulos,2
found that a doctor could require a pa-
tient to arbitrate any future medical
malpractice complaint before a panel of
specialists in the doctor's own field be-
cause the patient signed an arbitration
clause among a number of other docu-
ments just a few minutes before she
went into surgery,
The Gateway decision is more strik-
ing than these and many other pro-ar-
bitration cases because the Hills liter-
ally had no cnance to escape the
arbitration clause other than by mak-
ing the heroic effort of returning their
new computer. Realistically, they had
no chance to even learn of the existence
of the arbitration clause before the com-
puter was ordered, paid for, and deliv-
ered. While the Seventh Circuit implied
potential buyers might learn about
Gateway's arbitration program through
advertisements, the Gateway web page,
or conversations with Gateway person-
nel, these options are illusory. Neither
the advertisements' nor the web page
made any mention of arbitration.10 Fur-
ther, even had the Hills somehow had
the prescience to ask a salesperson
about arbitration," it is not at all clear
they could have obtained a copy of the
clause.u Even once the computer was
delivered it is by no means clear that a
typical consumer would have noticed or
understood the arbitration clause con-
tained on page 3, paragraph 10 of the
statement of terms document, which
was packed together with the computer,
monitor, keyboard, lots ofsoftware, and
multiple sets of instructions.
States' statutory attempts to protect
their consumers from unfair arbitration
clauses have been largely unsuccessful
because courts have found that state
laws that single out arbitration con-
tracts for more hostile treatment than
other contracts are preempted by the
FederalArbitrationAct,U as long as the
contract involves interstate com-
merce.14 For example, the Supreme
Court held preempted a Montana stat-
ute requiring adequate notice of an ar-
bitration provision contained in a con-
tract," as well as an Alabama statute
entirely prohibiting pro-dispute arbi-
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tration agreements. 6 In Securities In.
dustryAss'n v. Lewis, 7 the district court
held preempted a Florida statute re-
quiring that parties to securities arbi-
tration agreements be provided the op.
tion of presenting their claims before a
nonindustry arbitration panel.'
The outcome in Gateway, however, is
questionable on federal statutory, com-
mon law, and constitutional grounds.2'
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First, the Magnuson-MossAct, -passed
in 1974 'Lo improve the aaeqtiacy of
information available to consumers,
[and] prevent deception,"" provides
that consumers cannot, prior to their
assertion of a claim, be deprived of their
right to sue merchants in court. While
the Act allows merchants to establish
informal dispute settlement proce-
dures," the Act and the accompanying
regulations and legislative history im-
ply that these procedures must be non-
binding.P In comments issued together
with the regulations the FTC explicitly
rebutted claims of some industry re-
resentatives that warrantors ought, in
advance of a dispute, be allowed to re-
quire consumers to resort to binding
arbitration. It stated:
The Rule does not allow ior this for two rea-
sons. First .... Congressional intent was
that Section 110 Mechanisms not be legally
binding. Second, even if binding Mecha-
nisms were contemplated by Section 110 of
the Act, the Commission is not prepared, at
this point in time, to develop guidelines for
a system in which consumers would com-
mit themselves, at the time of product pur-
chase, to resolve afiy difficulties in a bind-
ing, but nonjudicial proceeding. The
Commission is not now convinced that any
guidelines which it set out could ensure suf-
ficient protection for consumers against
warrantors, even if the Congressional re-
port had uot made clear, as it did, that it
wished for such mechanisms to not be bind-
ing."2
While the agency commentary accom-
panying the MagnusGn-Moss Warranty
Act regulations observes that a warran-
tor may offer consumers the option of
binding arbitration, once a dispute has
arisen,' the regulations prohibit war-
rantors from mandating binding arbi-
tration prior to the occurrence of the
dispute.2
Gateway is also questionable as a
matter of contract law. While it is clear
that buyers and seller entered a con-
tract regarding purchase and sale of the
computer, that contract did not neces-
sarily include an arbitration provision.
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the
majority, essentially concluded that a
contract for arbitration was formed be-
cause the buyers accepted delivery of
the computer and then failed to return
it within 30 days. Yet, pursuant to the
more traditional contract analysis of-
fered by the buyers, the contract was
formed when, by accepting payment,
faxing a confirmation, and shipping the
computer, Gateway accepted the pur-
chase offer made by the Hills over the
phone. Buyers argue that because their
offer did not contain an arbit-ition
clause, the supplemental terms con-
tained'in the box were simply a pro-
posal for additional or modifying terms
which the buyers did not accept.25 Uni-
form Commercial Code §2-207 governs
such situations." Where, as in Gateway,
the contract was not between two mfer-
chants, §2-207 provides that if a party
accepts a contract but also states dif-
ferent or additional terms than were
offered, those terms are regarded as
mere "proposals for addition" and not
hodifications" to the contract.30 Here,
because the contract was entered be-
tween consumers and merchant prior
to the shipment of the computer, it
would seem that the Hills should not
be bound by the proposal for an arbi-
tration clause."
Third, although courts have gener-
ally rejected attempts to challenge pri-
vate arbitration agreements on consti-
tutional grounds, finding a lack of state
action and/or waiver of such claims,2
commentators are increasingly raising
the possibility of such an argument.3
The, state often throws its weight be-
hind private arbitration by interpret-
ing asserted agreements broadly to fa-
vor arbitration over litigation.U Where
courts rr- - on such a preference in their
interpre~ation of an arbitration agree-
ment the court arguably engages in
state action that calL ito play consti-
tutional protections Given the exist-
ence of state action, enforcing an un-
fair mandatory binding arbitration
agreement that was not knowingly and
voluntarily accepted by the consumer"
will often violate the Seventh Amend-
ment right .) a jury trial for claims
brought at common law in federal
court.Y If tl', state participates in en-
forcing such a waiver, it also potentially
acts unconstitutionally in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendments guaran.
tep of due process" and Article III's
guarantee of the riZiht to present a
claim to a federal court judge."
Finally, Gateway is unwise as a mat-
ter of policy. Judge Easterbrook basei
his conclusion that "[piractical consid-
erations support allowing vendors to
enclose the full legal terms with their
products," on a "straw man," asserting
that requiring cashiers to read such
terms over the phone would simply
"anesthetize" or anger potential cus-
tomers." This analysis is flawed be-
cause it fails to consider alternative
10 THE FLORIDA BAR JOURNAIJNOVEMBER 1997
HeinOnline -- 71 Fla. B.J. 10 1997
West Group will make
y 0 *00000 0 r 00000e 0000000a
your law firm home page
You'l Waie an ancwie, persuasive home page.
West Group's-home page marketfg consultants and designers
wiI 4elp you create a home page that looks greatworks
dently, nd is filled with persuasive Informition.
Wsfs 14 Deory des raflc to your home page.
.'Whn we host your homepage, you get FREE Professional
: rohelsings in West's, .kal Drectory" (WlD) for every
".1n yqu km, as Well as a FREE Frm Profile. When
'iit-ay f ou WI)listings, theyfna lin~k
page. To helpyou track traffic ot your home
9ai4dgIed monthly report of who's using your
d ien ts to rh om e pa -,-w e Ul
ft-r W , . -r~* es
Your home page will he available when people need it.
We'll ho your home page In a secure- iaframe, maintained 24.
horspe r day by experts and acceble by in coming lines W can
handle 20,000 cadspe secomfl Our flncial stability ensures we'l be
around a long time to maintain your home page.
-.Ai for a FIBEE consultation.
Layers hue trusted West Group compaesor more d1u ao
"'bw, tist us to help-ensure that yo'-irhome page 141AM6tI l
glowlig successTo discuss a home page forjrk p ,
1 oo45 56, ex 52003. For more Infor
'deiihonstration of Fhrmstes wNevexcrem*ifI
Internet at ww-%ydcoideno~htnt
F Sie'
h.yut .d u~mt4A ,i :.pv~ i awm~ Avt~ .m
;#4WOI~KA~ Y' -
- id kw nl &A pwktcifeitlglc m drpe'a W A
,fi ai Iw:n& "A,%+**
HeinOnline -- 71 Fla. B.J. 11 1997
ways to regulate dealer conduct and
because it ignores the potential signifi-
cance of allowing companies to require
consumers to trade their litigation
rights for arbitration. Companies can
use such clauses not only to take away
a consumer-friendly jury but also to
force consumers to bring claims in a
distant and thus expensive forum, to
impose high extra arbitration costs, to
deny consumers needed discovery, to
deprive consumers of recovery for pu-
nitive damages, and to prevent consum-
ers from using the economical class ac-
tion procedures that would be available
in court." The Gateway provision itself
was unfair in some of these ways. It
required that the dispute would be
heard under International Chamber of
Commerce rules Which demand the fil-
ing party to pay at least $2,000 for the
services of the ICC and its arbitrator.
What kind of sense would it make for a
consumer with a dispute over a $4,000
computer to pay half that amount in
arbitration fees alone?' 2 The clause also
required all claims to be brought in
Chicago, which would certainly be quite
expensive for those customers who,
unlike the Hills, did not live in Chi-
cage." Finally, the ICC rules make no
provision for discovery, which could well
prove crucial to a consumer's claim of
fraud or defect.
Assuming that the imposition of an
arbitration clause may have a signifi-
cant impact on consumers, Gateway
unreasonably shifts to consumers both
the search costs of ascertaining the ex-
istence of such a clause and the return
cost of avoiding such a clause. While it
might not make sense to require cash-
iers to read extensive terms to custom-
ers, surely it would not be unreason-
able to require the company to alert
customers to the existence of such an
important clause. Gateway might eas-
ily have done so in any number of ways:
by noting the existence of the arbitra-
tion clause in its advertisements where
it already mentioned the limited war-
ranty; by requiring its cashiers to men-
tion the arbitation clause and then
offering to read it or send it upon the
customer's request; or by at least in-
cluding mention of the clause on the
written confirmation that the company
sent to its customers prior to shipment
of the computer." While none of these
methods would guarantee that custom-
ers were not unfairly and unwittingly
deprived of their right to litigate dis-
putes in court, such methods would at
least decrease the likelihood of such an
outcome. It is simply wrong-to rest
waiver of a constitutional right on the
assumption that a consumer would
both read in detail all of the documents
enclosed with a new computer and then
take the dramatic and expensive step
of returning the brand new computer
to its shipper." Moreover, given the re-
alities of consumer behavior, it would
be preferable to flatly prohibit mer-
chants from requiring consumers to
waive their litigation rights in favor of
binding arbitration. At a minimum
merchants should be barred from im-
posing arbitration clauses that are un-
fair.
The Gateway arbitration clause was
not as bad for consumers as it might
have been. At least the clause didnot,
as some clauses do, require disputes to
be heard by biased decision makers"
rior limit the consumers' rights to pu-
nitive damages.' 7 However, Gateway
gives companies virtually free rein to
develop their own unfair clauses and
impose them after the fact on unwit-
ting consumers. Either courts or the
Congress should take steps quickly to
protect consumers from such practices.
We should not allow foxes to design the
chickens' coop. 0
1 Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir
1997) (rehearing denied). The arbitration
clause was on page 3, paragraph 10 of the
standard terms document, and the clause
was not highlighted nor displayed in large
print. (Clause on fie with auhor).
2The arbitration clause provided that ar-
bitration would be governed by the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce Rules ofAr-
bitration. These rules, normally applied to
large transactions between companies lo-
cated in different countries, require the
party filing a dispute for up to $50,000 to
pay administrative expenses of $2,000. The
rules further provide that the arbitrator's
fee in such cases shall be at least $2,000 up
to a maximum of 15 percent of the value of
the claim. While these fees can apparently
be split between the parties, they do not
include additional costs a party must gen-
erally pay such as for an attorney or for
travel.
3 105 F.3d 1147.
4 Badie v. Bank of America, 1994 WL
660730 (Cal. App. Dept Super. Ct. 1994).
3 Barry Meier, In Fine Pri,.t, Customers
Lose Ability to Sue, N.Y. Times, March 10,
1997, at 1.
4 2rminixInternatlonal Co. u. Ponzlo, 693
So. 2d 104 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1997). Cf.
2rminix International Co. v. Michaels, 688
So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1996) (custom-
ers who signed standard agreement calling
for arbitration in connection with purchase
of pest extermination services were not re-
quired to arbitrate personal injury claims
relating to pest extermination). The Florida
Supreme Court has observed that "[ulnder
Florida law ... arbitration is a favored
means of dispute resolution and courts in-
dulge every reasonable presumption to up-
hold proceedings resulting in an award.*Roe
v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co., 533 So. 2d
279 (Fla. 1988).
924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996).
'Id. at 3K9. The Utah Supreme Court held
that the rJuse would be enforceable only if
the evidence supported the doctor's claim
that the patient was given a copy of the
agreement when she left the hospital. In so
holding the court emphasized the fact that
the patient had 14 days within which to re-
voke the clause had she decided sh did not
wish to be bound by its terms. Nonetheless,
it is probably a very rare patient who, upon
returning home from surgery, would read
through all the papers she signed and take
the step of revoking her agreement to arbi-
tration. Other aiguably unfair decisions in-
clude Cohen v. Wedbish, Noble, Cooke, Inc.,
841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988) (securities cus-
tomers held bound by arbitration clause al-
though plaintiffs claimed brokerage misled
them by failing to inform them of the mean-
ing and effect of the clause); DeGaetano u.
Smith Barney, Inc., 1996 WL 44226
(S.D.N.Y 1996) (employee held bound by
arbitration provision even though she
signed only a general agreement setting out
"principles of employment" and was not ac-
tually provided with a copy of the arbitra-
tion agreement); McCarthy u. Providential
Corp., 1994 US. Dist. LEXIS 10122 (N.D.
Cal. 1994) (senior citizen homeowners held
bound by arbitration clause contained
within vast array of loan documents pro-
vided at closing).
I Although the advertisement did mention
a limited warranty, the purchasers had no
reason to believe that the warranty would
be used to deprive them of rights rather than
to provide them with protections should the
product turn out to be defective.
10 Of course, even if the web page had men-
tioned such a clause many computer cus-
tomers might well not have a computer that
would allow them to peruse the web page
in the first place.
1 In all likelihood, few customers would
have been focusing on the presence or ab-
sence of an arbitration clause. Rather, they
would probably have been thinking about
the $4,000 they, }ere spending on the com-
puter system, about all of the pleasure and
time savings they would get from their new
computer, andperhaps about the potential
difficulties they would face in setting up the
new system.
1 This author's persistent attempts to pro-
cure a copy of the arbitration provision from
Gateway sales a.d customer service repre-
sentatives did not prove productive.
Gateway's failure to provide this informa-
tion promptly would seem to violate the
Magnuson-Mcss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act. 15 U.S.C.
§2302; 16 C.F.R. §§701.3, 702.3,703.2 (writ-
ten warranty shall include information
about any informal dispute resolution pro-
12 THE FLORIDA BAR JOURNALINOVEMBER 1997
HeinOnline -- 71 Fla. B.J. 12 1997
cedure and shall promptly be made avail-
able to any consumer upon request).
0 9 U.S.C. §§1 et seq.
" Although states' protective legislation
would apply in the absence of interstate
commerce, the Supreme Court has defined
the term broadly to cover the full range of
Congress' authority to regulate all "c&m-
merce in fact." Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.
v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
15 Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto, 116
S.CL 1652 (1996).
'$AlliedBruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265 (1995).
1' 751 F. Supp. 205 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
Is The statute at issue was FLA. STAT.
§517.122, which provides that where secu-
rities brokers require their customers to
arbitrate claims they must provide the cus-
tomers "the option of having arbitration
before and pursuant to the rules of the
American Arbitration Association or other
independent non-industry arbitration forum
as well as any industry forum."
" Plaintiffs apparently did not present to
the court the Magnuson-Moss or constitu-
tional arguments discussed in this article,
and also did not make all of the contract
law arguments set out here.
"' 15 U.S.C. §§2301 et seq.
21 15 U.S.C. §2302(a).
2 15 U.S.C. §2310(aX3).
2" The statute provides that the informal
dispute resolution procedure must comply
with regulations adopted by the Federal
Trade Commission, 15 U.S.C. §2310(aX2),
and that the consumer may pursue a legal
remedy only after resorting to the appro-
priate internal procedure. 15 U.S.C.
§2310(a). The FTC rules explicitly state that
"decisions of the [informal dispute] mecha-
nism shall not be legally binding on any
person." ,16 C.F.R. §703.5(j). See also 16
C.F.R. §703.5(g) (consumer who is dissatis-
fied with informal decision may pursue le-
gal remedies). The legislative history of the
statute is clear that the informal dispute
procedures were envisioned as a prerequi-
site rather than a substitute for court rem-
edies. Remarks of Congressman Moss, 119
Cong. Rec. 972 (Jan. 12, 1973); H.R. Rep.
93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. 41 reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7723. See gen-
erally Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, Inc., 954
F. Supp. 1530 (M.). Ala. 1997) (given re-
strictions of Magnuson-Moss, mobile home
manufacturer may not compel consumer to
arbitrate claims against manufacturer
based on arbitration agreement between
consumer and retailer).
2 40 Fed. Reg. 60168, 60210 (1975). See
also id. at 60211 ("reference within the writ-
ten warranty to any binding, non-judiCial
remedy is prohibited by the Rule and the
Act').
2540 Fed. Reg. 60168, 60211 (1975).
2 16 C.F.R. §703.5(j). Even assuming for
the sake of argument the validity of a pre-
dispute agreement to binding arbitration of
a consumer claim, the FTC rules prohibit
companies from using ADR mechanisms
that are unfair in certain ways. Companies
cannot charge consumers any fee for use of
the mechanism, 16 C.F.R. §703.3(a), nor
have the disputes decided by persons who
are employed by the company for any pur-
pose other than to resolve disputes. 16
C.F.R. §703.4(a)(1). The company is also
supposed to ensure that the decision maker
is sufficiently "insulated" from the warran-
tor, for example in terms of personnel deci-
sions, that the decision will not be biased.
16 C.F?. §703.3(b). The clause at issue in
Gateway is impermissible because the ICC
rules require consumers to share the arbi-
tration fees and costs.
2While the court is not explicit as to how
the contract was formed, it imp lies that the
vendor was the offeror and the buyer the
offeree. 105 F.3d at 1148-49. The analysis
drew from the Seventh Circuit's earlier de-
cidion in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d
1447 (7th Cir. 1996), holding that a software
purchaser was bound by a license agreement
where the box mentioned that the software
was governed by a license and where the
license was provided in the manual and
appeared on a user's srreen every time the
program was run. Gateway is a more ex-
treme case than ProCD in at least two re-
spects. First, the Gateway customers re-
ceived no notification at all; prior to delivery,
that they would be subject to an arbitration
clause. Second, an arbitration cla,,se is a
waiver of constitutional rights, as 'posed
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to a waiver of mere economic interests.
2 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 96-3294,
Responsive Brief of Appellees at 13-14 (on
file with author).
29 The Gateway court observed that U.C.C.
§2-207 is irrelevant where there is only one
form, and not a "battle of the forms" between
the two parties, 105 F.2d at 1150, but did
not expressly state whether or how the pro-
vision applied to the computer sale. How-
ever, by its terms the section does seem to
apply to this situation where the shipper
accepted the buyer's offer and then submit-
ted additional terms. Further, even if U.C.C.
§2-207 is in fact irrelevant it would seem
that the buyers never accepted the arbitra-
tion clause. It has long been established that
mere silence is not sufficient to accept a con-
tract. Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§69 provides, in relevant part, that silence
does not constitute acceptance except
"[w]here the offeror has stated or given the
offeree reason to understand that assent
may be manifested by silence or inaction,
and the offeree in remaining silent and in-
active intends to accept the offer ... [orJ
[w]here because of previous dealings or oth-
erwise, it is reasonable that the offeree
should notify the offeror if he does not in-
tend to accept." Neither exception applies
in this instance.
30 Even where the contract is between mer-
chants, terms that "materially alter" the
original offer do not automatically become
part of the contract. Arbitration clauses
have been held to constitute material terms
that may not be incorporated absent affir-
mative assent, even against merchants.
E.g., Diskin v. J.P Stevens & Co., 836 F.2d
47,50-51 (1st Cir. 1987). The new terms also
do not modify a contract between merchants
if the offer expressly limited acceptance to
the terms of the offer or if notification of
objection to the new terms was previously
given or is given within a reasonable time
after notice of them is received. U.C.C. §2-
207.
31 The "Standard Terms and Conditions"
agreement enclosed with the computer did
include a statement that by keeping the
computer the customers agreed to be bound
by the terms. However, pursuant to the
U.C.C. and standard contract law this pre-
liminary statement itself should not have
been binding on the Hills.
32 E.g., Terminix International Co. v.
Ponzio, 693 So. 2d 104,108 (Fla. 5th D.C.A.
1997) ("The short answer to these [consti-
tutional] arguments is that the plaintiffs
waived these rights by consenting to arbi-
trate disputes 'arising out of ... the agree-
ment'). See also FDIC v. Air Florida, 822
F.2d 833, 833 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting chal-
lenge to constitutionality of arbitration
based on lack of state action).
3 E.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public Jus-
tice: Toward a State Action Theory ofADR,
85 CAL. L. REv. 577 (1997) (arguing that
role of state courts in compelling arbitra-
tion and confirming arbitral results is suf-
ficient to give rise to state action); Jean
R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitution-
ality of the Supreme Court's Preference for
Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment
of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers and
Due Process Concerns, forthcoming 72
TuiANE L. Rv. (Nov. 1997) (arguing that
reliance on state preference for arbitra-
tion over litigation gives rise to state ac-
tion, and that unknowing waivers do not
meet constitutional standards). Cf. Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state court
violated equal protection clause by grant-
ing injunctive relief to a litigant seeking
to enforce a privately negotiated racially
restrictive covenant).
3 E.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)
("Questions of arbitrability must be ad-
dressed with a healthy regard for the fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration .... The
Arbitration Act establishes that, as a mat-
ter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration, whether the prob-
lem at hand is the construction of the con-
tract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability.").
3 See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Re-
thinking the Constitutionality of the Su-
preme Court's Preference for Binding Arbi-
tration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial,
Separation of Powers and Due Process Con-
cerns, forthcoming 72 TuLANE L. Rlv. (Nov.
1997).
3 While constitutional rights are subject
to waiver, courts generally "indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver."
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389,393
(1937). Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972), held that a waiver of procedural due
process rights must be clear, and further
implied that even a clear waiver might be
struck down on grounds of involuntariness.
Applying these standards, the Gateway
computer purchasers and most other con-
sumers should not be found to have waived
their constitutional rights to ajury trial, due
process, and an Article ITT judge. See gener-
ally Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 35,
at 53-82.
1 Many state constitutions provide simi-
lar rights for claims brought in state court.
However, courts might find that the FAA
preempts such state constitutional provi-
sions.
3 Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 35, at
96-118.Although not all binding arbitration
clauses would likely be found to violate due
process, those that were unfair or biased
would do so.
SId. at 93-96. The Article III claim could
be raised only by those litigants who would
have had a right to sue in federal court.
0 105 F.3d at 1149.
41 See generally Jean R. Steralight, Pana.
cea or Corporate Tool: Debunking the Su-
preme Court's Preference for Binding Arbi.
tration, 74 WAsH. U.L.Q. 637,674-697 (1996)
(arguing that companies can use binding ar-
bitration to secure strategic advantages over
consumers, employees, and franchisees).
12 The arbitration fee is over and above any
attorneys' fees and travel costs the customer
must also pay. At least in litigation the judge
is free.
4 By contrast, had the consumers been
able to bring a lawsuit they would have been
permitted to bring it in any jurisdiction
where they could secure personal jurisdic-
tion over Gateway.
"Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 96-3294,
Responsive Brief of Appellees at 7 (discuss-
ing Gateway shipping procedures) (on file
with author).
46 Because most consumers will believe
it is statistically unlikely they would need
to sue Gateway, they will tend to under-
value the cost imposed by the arbitration
clause and will not likely return the com-
puter they have so eagerly awaited.
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cog-
nition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN.
L. Ray. 211,217 (1995).See also Sternlight,
Panacea, supra note 41, at 688-693 (cri-
tiquing assumption of consumer rational-
ity).
15 In theory, both the FAA, 9 U.S.C.
§10(a)(2) and the Magnuson-Moss Act
regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§703.3 & 703.4,
prohibit the use of biased arbitrators.
However, in practice courts have often re-
fused to credit consumers' claims of bias.
E.g., Sosa u. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah
1996) (refusing to strike arbitration clause
on ground that alleged medical malprac-
tice victim was required to present claim
to doctors in defendant's specialty area).
47 Courts have sometimes struck such
clauses as in violation of an underlying fed-
eral statute. E.g., Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO
Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994) (ar-
bitration clause which, inter alia, precluded
recovery of punitive damages held void un-
der federal Petroleum Management Protec-
tion Act).
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MEMBER BENEFITS
Fall 1997
Program Update Featuring:
-Office Depot Business Services Division offers savings from 40% to 80% off
products listed in the program catalog. In addition, a list of 150 of the most commonly used
"commodity office products" has been assembled and items included are offered to Florida Bar
members at an even lower price. Add up to fifty items suited to the unique needs of your practice
to this list and receive the same negotiated percentage savings on your own customized products
list. Free next day delivery is included. For unanticipated and/or after hour purchases, an in-store
purchasing card is provided.
To take advantage of these savings, complete the Office Depot application provided as an insert in
the November 1 issue of The Florida Bar News and fax to Carole Thompson, Office Depot, 1-800-
816-3139. Upon approval of your account, you will be contacted by an Office Depot account
executive to complete the set up process and familiarize you with this exciting new program for
Florida Bar members.
* WorldCom Long Distance Telephone Service provides members a cost-effective
telecommunications service for home and/or businesses of all sizes. For information on home
service, call 1-888-876-9869. The business service number to call is 1-800-539-2000.
-Other Programs Available to Members
Association Insurance Programs Business Planning Concepts, Inc.
Court and Surety Bonds JurisCo
Professional Liability Insurance FLMIC
Car Rentals
Computerized Legal Research
Credit Card Program
Document Assembly System
Express Shipping
Eyecare
Magazine Subscriptions
Wireless Communications Products
Alamo #93718
Avis #A421600
Hertz #152030
National #5650262
Lexis -Nexis Advantage
MBNA
Automated Leg Sys "ProDoc"
Airborne Express #N82
Lens Express #FLBAR
Subscription Services
Cellular Works
800-282-8626
800-274-2663
800-633-6458
800-354-2322
800-331-1212
800-654-2200
800-227-7368
800-356-6548
800-457-3714
800-759-5418
800-443-5228
800-666-5367
800-289-6247
800-235-5967
Member Benefits. The Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida, 32399-2300
HeinOnline -- 71 Fla. B.J. 17 1997
